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The Sword and the Shield: Disunity Over the 
Application of the Clean Water Act’s Permit Shield 
Provision
INTRODUCTION
The vast waters of America swirled, ebbed, and flowed in a sad, murky 
state in the summer of 1969.1 Volatile pollutants dumped for decades into 
the nation’s waterways and waterbodies were in such high concentration 
that one river literally caught fire.2 This pollution crisis was not new. Prior 
to 1969, Congress made numerous attempts to curb the discharge of 
pollution into America’s waters, but these efforts fell short, failing to 
manage the existing high levels of water pollution.3 President Lyndon B. 
Johnson auspiciously declared that water pollution would “be doomed” in 
the 20th century when he signed the Water Quality Act of 1965.4 However, 
the events of June 1969 contradicted President Johnson’s bold assertion 
when the nation discovered the shocking extent of the pollution problem 
in America. In the Cuyahoga River, an ember spark ignited its polluted 
waters, lit the river ablaze, and fueled the fire for comprehensive, top-
down water pollution legislative reform.5
This comprehensive congressional reform resulted in the Clean Water
Act (CWA), which substantially reformed the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1948.6 The CWA, which Congress passed over a veto from 
President Nixon, altered the way America regulated water pollution.7 In the 
decades since its passage, the substantially amended CWA has provided
Americans with cleaner, safer water;8 although Americans today generally 
enjoy cleaner water across the country, the discharge of pollutants remains 
ever present and continues to contaminate the waterways and waterbodies 
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of America.9 The continuity of water pollution illuminates a hard truth: 
Congress recognized the unrealistic expectation that no facility, industrial 
process, or person would ever pollute a water source.10 As a result, the 
CWA provides for a wide range of guidelines, procedures, and regulations 
for polluters to follow when discharging pollutants.11
The CWA provides the federal government and the states with a 
pollution permitting system known as the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES).12 The NPDES statutory regime—one of the 
many permitting provisions of the CWA, and the statute focused on by this 
Case Note—addresses how facilities may lawfully obtain permits to 
discharge pollutants from a point source into a waterbody.13 The NPDES 
regime also contains a more ambiguous section known as the “permit 
shield” provision, which provides NPDES permit holders protection from 
civil and criminal liability if they comply with the specifications and 
regulations of their NPDES permits.14 It is this balancing act of regulatory
oversight and industry liability protection that comprises the NPDES 
regulatory scheme today.
This Case Note addresses a federal circuit split between the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits over the application of 
the CWA permit shield provision and argues for a broader interpretation 
of the CWA permit shield that, on its face, provides greater protection to 
industry but allows permit issuing authorities to regulate state water 
quality standards on a more particularized level. Part I illustrates the 
relationship between the NPDES permitting process and the CWA permit 
shield protection provision and presents early case law and administrative 
decisions that formed the basis of the judiciary’s interpretation of the 
permit shield provision’s application. Part II examines the circuit split 
between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and the resulting disunity over the 
applicability of the CWA permit shield defense with respect to NPDES 
permit holders when the permit sets out specific effluent limitations and 
                                                                                                            
9. EPA, supra note 3.
10. JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, CLEAN WATER ACT 15 (2d ed. 2012).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (1987).
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merely incorporates state water quality standards by reference. Part III 
discusses the issues and ambiguity resulting from the dueling Circuit 
opinions. Part IV explains why the Fourth Circuit decision, subject to some 
limitations, promotes a more effective model of cooperative federalism 
that honors the state role envisioned by the CWA without unfairly 
discriminating against industry and business. Finally, Part V concludes by 
recognizing the benefits of a limited Fourth Circuit rationale.
I. BACKGROUND
Much like the waterways it protects, the Clean Water Act contains a 
series of regulatory “tributaries” that make difficult the successful 
navigation of the CWA’s regulatory framework and provide challenges for 
regulators and regulated parties alike. Navigation of this framework is 
subject to the confluence of legislative amendments, administrative 
implementation, and judicial interpretation. 
A. The Many Tributaries of the Clean Water Act
The CWA provides regulations and guidelines focused on the control 
of water pollution, the discharge of pollutants, and the protection of 
America’s waters.15 The CWA embodies a cooperative form of federalism 
through the NPDES system that involves federal, state, and local entities 
working in concert to set water quality requirements, manage permit 
programs, and set effluent limitation standards and guidelines for water 
pollutants.16 The CWA, through the NPDES program, provides a statutory 
regime that addresses liability and procedural requirements that regulatory 
authorities, permit enforcers, and regulated parties must follow.17 The 
multifaceted aspects of this statutory and regulatory framework will be 
discussed herein.
1. Liability under the Clean Water Act
The CWA establishes a default regime of strict liability for facilities 
and natural persons that discharge pollutants into a waterbody.18 Although 
Congress, at the time of passage, intended for the CWA to ultimately 
eliminate all pollutants present in the nation’s waterways, Congress 
recognized the technological infeasibility of prohibiting all pollutants in 
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the short term and the severe burdens such a prohibition would have on 
business, industry, and the economy as a whole.19 As a result, Congress 
carved out exceptions within the statutory language of the CWA. The crux 
of the CWA’s strict liability is found in section 301(a), which provides 
that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful” 
unless the discharge complies with exceptions under the CWA.20 The 
primary exception to liability imposed by the CWA is the section 402 
NPDES permitting system.21
Under section 402 of the CWA, the NPDES permitting system provides 
effluent limitations22 on the amount of pollutants that individuals or industry 
can discharge from a point source into a waterbody.23 An “effluent 
limitation” is the primary enforcement mechanism NPDES permitting 
authorities employ to restrict and control the amount of pollutants 
discharged into a particular waterbody.24 The effluent limitations utilized 
during the permit review process are derived from effluent limitation 
guidelines; the guidelines vary depending on the level of pollutant present 
in the water and the availability of current pollutant control technologies.25
The scope of “waterbodies” covered by the CWA includes traditional 
navigable waters, interstate waters, and wetlands adjacent to either 
traditional navigable waters or interstate waters.26 Waterbodies classified 
as non-navigable tributaries that lead to traditional navigable waters that 
are relatively permanent, as well as wetlands that directly abut relatively 
permanent waters also fall under the CWA’s purview.27 Further still, 
waters outside these classifications may receive CWA protection if a fact-
                                                                                                            
19. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10.
20. Clean Water Act § 301(a) (“[e]xcept as in compliance with this section 
and [other sections of the Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall 
be unlawful.”).
21. DIETRICH H. EARNHART & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, POLLUTION LIMITS 
AND POLLUTER’S EFFORTS TO COMPLY: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
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22. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2019).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2019). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(c) (2019). 
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2019) (The term "effluent limitation" means any 
restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and 
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are 
discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous 
zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance).
25. Id.
26. Guidance to Identify Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/MQ4Y-YCT9 (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
27. Id.
2019] NOTE 589
specific analysis determines the existence of a “significant nexus” to 
traditional navigable waters or interstate waters.28 The legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended the NPDES permit to be one of the few 
means by which a discharger of pollutants from a point source may escape 
the strict liability of CWA section 301(a).29 While the CWA statutorily 
created the NPDES permitting system, the EPA and state permitting 
authorities enjoy some discretion in the system’s implementation.
2. The Mechanics of the NPDES Permitting System
The NPDES permitting system embodies a model of cooperative 
federalism between the federal government, states, and local 
municipalities.30 Congress authorized the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to act as the administrator of the NPDES permitting 
program, while also empowering the EPA to authorize states to administer 
state-level NPDES permit programs.31 To date, the EPA has authorized 
forty states and several Native American tribal territories to create, 
administer, and maintain NPDES programs.32 In states and territories that 
do not have authorization to administer a NPDES permitting program, one 
of ten regional offices maintained by the EPA reviews, authorizes, and 
issues permits directly.33 States that seek permit program authorization 
have clear guidelines to follow in order to receive permitting authority.34
Unauthorized states wishing to establish and administer their own 
NPDES permit programs must seek approval from the EPA under the 
CWA.35 This process requires a state’s governor to submit a description of 
the proposed permitting program the state plans to implement to the EPA’s 
administrator.36 Legal counsel on behalf of the state’s water-pollution 
                                                                                                            
28. Id. (Tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters,
wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or 
interstate waters. Also includes waters that fall under the "other waters" category 
of the regulations. The guidance divides these waters into two categories, those 
that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and those that are not, 
and discusses how each category should be evaluated).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). 
30. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
31. ROBIN K. CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION:
LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT 27 (2d ed. 2009).
32. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 7, at 15.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2019).
36. Id.
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control authority must then prove to the EPA that the state laws provide 
the state-administered NPDES program with sufficient authority to 
properly administer the program.37 The CWA statutorily obligates the
EPA to approve a state program when it finds that state laws provide the 
proposed program with sufficient measures to comply with the EPA’s 
effluent limitations requirements.38
Upon approval of a state-administered NPDES program, the EPA 
suspends all federal permitting authority within the state.39 It is at this stage 
that states have primacy40 over the administration of the NPDES permit 
program; however, such “state primacy” is not absolute.41 Although the 
CWA permits the EPA Administrator to “encourage cooperative activities 
by the States for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution,” 
the EPA still retains federal standard setting and permitting authority.42 As 
a result, states must enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 
the EPA concerning the water quality standards of the state permit 
program.43 The MOA refers specifically to state water quality standards 
determined by state permitting authorities rather than effluent limitation 
guidelines promulgated by the EPA.44
The states must submit copies of every permit application and notice 
of every action with respect to each permit application to the EPA.45
Furthermore, the EPA retains the power to veto a state permit under 
section 402(d) and issue its own permit for a polluting facility if a state 
fails to meet the minimum regulatory requirements set by the EPA.46
While states must abide by the minimum federal water quality 
standards—initially in the form of effluent limitation guidelines set by the 
EPA—states are free to impose more stringent requirements than those 
demanded at the federal level, which often results in significant differences 
between state permitting programs and their federal counterparts.47 The 
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46. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019); GALLAGHER & MILLER supra note 7, at 19.
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type of permit determines the scope of regulatory enforcement from the 
permit issuing authority and the level of compliance the permit holder 
must maintain. 
3. Types of NPDES Permits: Individual and General
NPDES permits target substantive discharge of pollutants from a point 
source into a waterbody. For example, any facility that adds pollutants 
resulting from its industrial processes through a pipe into a stream or lake 
must have a NPDES permit to discharge those pollutants.48 Pollutant 
sources that are not considered “point sources,” such as discharges into 
sewer systems or runoff that does not collect into ditches, are not subject 
to NPDES permits.49
The two types of NPDES permits for which a facility can apply are
individual permits and general permits. Starting with the latter, a general 
permit applies to multiple facilities within similar operating parameters 
located within the same geographical region.50 General permits are more 
cost-effective for both the applying facility and permit issuing authority 
than individual permits because a single permit can cover multiple 
facilities.51 A facility may apply for a general permit if its pollutant 
discharges meet the minimum, blanket requirements set forth by the 
general permitting authority.52 If a facility’s discharges do not meet these 
requirements the facility must apply for an individual permit specific to its 
discharge needs.53
Permitting authorities develop and issue an individual permit for a 
specific facility based on information disclosed in the permit application 
regarding the types of pollutants the facility produces or intends to 
produce.54 Individual permits expire after five years and often contain 
effluent limitations specific to the applicant seeking a permit or the water 
source receiving the applicant’s pollutant discharge.55 In this context, a 
permitting authority must consider technology-based effluent limitations.56
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Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 415 (2007).
49. Id.
50. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
51. Id.
52. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
53. Id.
54. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
55. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
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Technology-based effluent limitations set minimum requirements that 
determine the treatment of pollutants released through point source 
discharges.57 These effluent limitations allow the discharger to use any 
available control technique to meet the required limits.58 When only
implementing technology-based effluent limitations on NPDES permits 
proves to be inadequate to maintain water quality standards, CWA section
303(d) provides states with a procedural method to develop and implement 
total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) to preserve water quality standards.59
A TMDL serves to identify the amount of a specific pollutant or 
component of a pollutant that a polluter may discharge into a waterbody 
without compromising the water quality standards of the waterbody 
itself.60 The TMDL analysis builds in a margin of safety for its water
quality preservation allocations by including pollutants from nonpoint 
sources and naturally occurring environmental sources.61 Necessarily, and 
unsurprisingly, water-quality based limits are also of concern during the 
TMDL analysis.62
4. The Intersection of State Water Quality Standards and TMDLS
While much of the analysis under the CWA looks to regulate pollution 
at the source, section 303 focuses on the water quality of the receiving 
waterbodies.63 This section holds states accountable for designating water 
quality standards for all waters within their respective boundaries.64 The 
section explicitly provides that states must set these water quality 
standards regardless of the source of pollution entering the waters.65 The 
judiciary has long recognized these water quality standards to serve “as a 
supplementary basis” for effluent limitations to further regulate point 
source discharges from reducing water quality below the acceptable 
levels.66
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58. Id.
59. HOUCK, supra note 8, at 76.
60. Id. at 79.
61. Id. at 80.
62. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 56.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
64. Roger Flynn, New Life for Impaired Waters: Realizing the Goal to 
“Restore” the Nation’s Waters Under the Clean Water Act, 10 WYO. L. REV. 35, 
42 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Section 303 lays out three components of all state water quality 
programs: (1) states must establish the specific “designated uses” of its 
waters;67 (2) states must promulgate the “numeric and narrative” water 
quality conditions that govern, among other things, limitations on 
pollutant levels to preserve the designated uses of the water;68 and (3) 
states must adopt “antidegradation” policies to prevent any further 
deterioration of water quality.69 These state water quality provisions serve 
as independent and individually enforceable standards under federal law.70
As a result, permit issuing agencies must consider the potential impact 
on state water quality of every potential discharge from a point source 
facility.71 If a permit issuing authority anticipates disclosed discharges will 
violate state water quality standards, section 303 requires the permit 
authority to issue stricter standards.72 Despite the complex procedural and 
substantive guidelines governing NPDES permit and state water quality 
standards, a regulatory provision within the CWA—dubbed the permit 
shield” provision—serves to protect permit holders from liability when 
certain criteria are met.
B. The Clean Water Act “Permit Shield” Provision
As mentioned, the Clean Water Act contains a “permit shield” 
provision that provides NPDES permit holders protection from liability, 
such as civil lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions.73 Specifically, 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) of the CWA states that compliance with an NPDES
permit issued pursuant to this section is viewed as compliance with the 
CWA.74 This language, on its face, is ambiguous and subject to different 
interpretations. The legislative history suggests that the permit shield 
provision is designed to assuage the fears of NPDES permit holders that 
every subsequent enactment of a regulation might subject them to a civil 
suit or a state enforcement action.75 Treading similar waters, the Supreme 
                                                                                                            
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
68. Id.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).
70. Flynn, supra note 64.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2019).
74. Id.
75. (“Through amendments to the Act in 1977 and additional agency 
regulations and interpretations, numerous categories of waters and activities were 
classified as exempt from permit requirements under the Act”). S. REP. NO. 111-
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Court held in 1977 that the permit shield provision protects permit holders
from various subsequent revisions of regulations and prevents permit 
holders from litigating over whether their current, valid permit is subject 
to the newer regulatory standards.76
In light of the legislative intent and subsequent Supreme Court 
interpretation, the “permit shield defense” doctrine has developed further 
through federal case law and administrative decisions by the EPA.77
Despite four decades of judicial and administrative review, the application 
of the permit shield doctrine remains ambiguous and continues to be a 
source of much litigation and regulatory action today.
II. EARLY GUIDANCE: ATLANTIC STATES, IN RE KETCHIKAN, & PINEY RUN
Permit holders, regardless of the issuing authority, must comply with 
effluent limitations on pollutant discharges and various monitoring, 
testing, and reporting requirements.78 The guidance provided from three 
major sources, the Second Circuit’s decision in Atlantic States, the EPA’s 
administrative decision in Ketchikan, and the Fourth Circuit’s two-factor 
test opined in Piney Run have allowed the judiciary, regulatory agencies, 
and permit holders alike to, for the most part, manage their expectations
with respect to the NPDES permitting process. The result is that NPDES 
administrative decisions and case law generally conclude that NPDES 
permit holders are shielded from CWA liability for discharges that are in 
compliance with express limitations of its permit.79
Additionally, courts have extended the permit shield doctrine to
insulate valid permit holders from liability for discharges of pollutants that 
they disclosed to the permitting authority during the application process 
but that were not otherwise listed in the permit, provided that such 
discharges are reasonably anticipated by80 or within the reasonable 
contemplation of the permitting authority at the time the permit issues.81
                                                                                                            
361 No. 92-911, at 3 (2010) (citing EPA, Clean Water Section 404 Program 
Definition and Permit Exemptions, Final Rule, 53 FED. REG. 20764 (June 6, 1988).
76. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977).
77. Id.
78. See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 
(2nd Cir. 1993).
79. Atlantic States Legal Found. 12 F.3d 353 (2nd Cir. 1993); Ketchikan Pulp 
Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 606 (EAB 1998); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. City Comm’rs, 268 
F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); Julie Kaplan, Does EPA’s View of the CWA Permit 
Shield Too Much? (2013), https://perma.cc/MN93-49FA.
80. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 606 (EAB 1998).
81. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. City Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
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District Courts, administrative agencies, and permit seekers frequently 
rely upon these cases and foundational decisions to determine the scope of 
a NPDES permit.
A. Atlantic States: Extending the Permit
The Second Circuit provided in Atlantic States an avenue for permit 
holders to discharge pollutants not otherwise listed in their active NPDES 
permit, as long as the permit holders observe proper reporting and 
mandatory disclosure requirements during the permit application 
process.82 In this case, an environmental group known as Atlantic States 
brought suit claiming that Eastman Kodak violated the CWA by exceeding 
the limitations on its effluent discharges and by discharging sixteen 
different pollutants into the Genesee River that were not listed in Kodak’s 
NPDES permit.83 The court rejected Atlantic States’ argument that section
301 of the CWA prohibited the discharge of pollutants not expressly 
authorized by an NPDES permit.84
Instead, the Second Circuit recognized that NPDES permits identify 
and impose limitations on pollutants that are the most hazardous to human 
health and environmental water quality.85 The numerous disclosure and 
reporting requirements, the court reasoned, adequately extended the scope 
of NPDES coverage to the discharge of unlisted pollutants.86 This
expansion of NPDES coverage holds true to the legislative rationale 
behind the permit shield provision because reporting and full disclosure is 
a mandatory requirement for the permit shield defense. Cheating these 
                                                                                                            
82. Id. at 357.
83. Id. at 355–56.
84. Id. at 357–58.
85. Id. at 357. 
86. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 
(2nd Cir. 1993):
EPA did not intend to require water quality-based permit limitations on 
all pollutants contained in a discharge . . . The proper interpretation of 
the regulations is that developing water quality-based limitations is a
step-by-step process….[W]ater quality-based limits are established 
where the permitting authority reasonably anticipates the discharge of 
pollutants by the permittee at levels that have the reasonable potential to 
cause or contribute to an excursion above any state water quality 
criterion.
(quoting Memorandum from Director, Office of Wastewater Enforcement and 
Compliance to Water Management Division Directors, Regions I–X, at 2–3 (Aug. 
14, 1992).
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requirements renders the permit shield provision inapplicable and subjects 
the permit holder to liability, thus foreclosing any permit shield defense.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Atlantic States expanded the scope 
of NPDES permits beyond the express, black-letter language within the 
four corners of a permit. Moreover, this decision expanded the 
applicability of the permit shield defense based upon the correlation 
between compliance and invocation of the permit shield defense. Self-
reporting and full disclosure, simply put, allow for non-permitted 
expansion of effluent discharge. Under Atlantic States, the more ways a 
facility can comply with its NPDES permit, the more likely it can invoke 
the permit shield provision and escape liability. Atlantic States fell in line 
with EPA guidance policies on this issue, and was followed by a major 
administrative decision by the EPA Environmental Appeals Board in 
Ketchikan.87
B. In re Ketchikan: Reasonable Anticipation of Permitting Authority
The EPA Environmental Appeals Board determined that the NPDES 
permit not only covered pollutants actually listed in the permit itself but 
included any pollutants disclosed to the permitting authority during the 
application process.88 This effectively meant that facilities with NPDES 
permits could discharge pollutants that were not listed in their issued 
permit but that still fell within the scope of a NPDES permit (and the 
permit shield defense), as long as the facilities made adequate disclosures
to the proper permit issuing authority.89 The Board reached this conclusion 
because it was virtually impossible to identify and ascertain every 
chemical element present within a given pollutant discharge, and, as a 
result, the EPA determined that the “goals of the CWA may be more 
effectively achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and waste streams 
established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by permittees in their 
permit applications.”90
The Board reasoned that a proper interpretation of the CWA 
regulatory scheme was one in which “[w]ater quality based limits are 
established where the permitting authority reasonably anticipates the 
discharge of pollutants by the permittee at levels that have the reasonable 
                                                                                                            
87. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998).
88. Id. at 606.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 618.
2019] NOTE 597
potential to cause or contribute to an excursion above any state water 
quality criterion.”91
As a result of the EPA’s decision in Ketchikan, NPDES permitting 
authorities and facilities seeking a permit have a structured process to 
follow.92 Under this procedural structure: (1) an applicant informs the 
permitting authority of the nature of its effluent discharges; (2) the 
permitting authority subsequently engages in an environmental risk 
assessment; and (3) the permitting authority places limitations on 
pollutants it “reasonably anticipates” could adversely impact the 
environmental quality of the affected waterbody.93 The remaining
limitation on the permit holder's ability to discharge pollutants simply 
requires that the discharges must be reasonably anticipated by, or within 
the reasonable contemplation of, the permitting authority.94 As long as a 
permit holder complies with the CWA’s reporting and disclosure 
requirements, it may discharge pollutants not expressly disclosed in the 
permit.95 To the extent that a permit holder discharges a pollutant that it 
failed to report or disclose, the permit holder violates their NPDES permit
and the CWA, and cannot invoke the CWA permit shield defense.96
The Ketchikan decision further broadened the scope of NPDES 
permits by distilling the reasoning behind the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Atlantic States into a multi-factor procedure for both permit seekers and 
permit issuing authorities to follow, while providing a level of discretion 
to the permit issuing authority when formulating what it “reasonably 
anticipates” could harm the environment or violate state water quality 
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standards. This result further extends the scope of NPDES permits and the 
permit shield defense to cover expressly listed pollutants, unlisted 
pollutants, and pollutant discharges that permitting agencies may 
“reasonably anticipate.”
C. Piney Run: Fourth Circuit Guides the Federal Courts
In Piney Run, the Fourth Circuit, deferring to the EPA’s decision in 
Ketchikan, created a two-part test to determine if NPDES permit holders 
were in compliance with their permits and therefore shielded from liability 
under the CWA.97 This test, simple on its face, asks: (1) whether the 
discharger disclosed the pollutants to the permitting agency, and (2) whether 
the discharge was within the “reasonable contemplation” of that agency.98
In Piney Run, an environmental group filed suit against a Maryland county 
alleging that a county-operated waste processing facility violated the CWA 
by discharging warm water into the Piney Run stream.99 The district court 
found that the county facility violated its NPDES permit because the 
discharge of heat into a waterway was not expressly allowed by the 
permit.100 The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s interpretation and 
application of the CWA.101 Instead, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the 
scope of a NPDES permit includes not only the permit’s express language, 
but also implicit references to pollutant discharges not listed in the permit 
that were revealed through the disclosures made during the application, 
monitoring, and reporting phases.102
Under a Chevron analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that because the 
CWA provision in question, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k), is ambiguous, and 
because the EPA’s interpretation of this provision is reasonable, courts 
must defer to it in evaluating the scope of a NPDES permit.103 The EPA in 
Ketchikan clearly adopted the interpretation that, when NPDES permit 
holders provide adequate disclosures to the permitting authority about the 
nature of their discharges, the discharge of pollutants not expressly listed 
in their NPDES permits is acceptable.104 The Fourth Circuit’s decision to 
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include references to pollutant discharges during the reporting and 
disclosure stage provides an important distinction for permit applicants. 
First, it incentivizes permit-seeking applicants to disclose all 
pollutants and byproducts resulting from its industrial process to the 
permit issuing authority. The more information disclosed, the more tools 
a permitting authority can use to make the necessary effluent limitation 
determinations. Second, the Fourth Circuit creates test binds lower courts 
within the circuit and holds far more persuasiveness in the federal courts
rather than the test being isolated to an administrative adjudication within 
the EPA.
Courts have relied on the Piney Run test time and time again when 
determining the scope of NPDES permits and the proper application of the 
CWA’s “permit shield” provision.105 This test, as well as the expectations 
of NPDES permit holders, now appears weakened by a recent Fourth 
Circuit decision and the resulting circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth 
circuits.106
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE PERMIT SHIELD AND STATE WATER 
QUALITY
The current split between the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit 
involves similar issues regarding NPDES permit discharge limitations and 
state water quality issues. While these issues may be similar, the two vastly 
different conclusions between the circuits warrant scrutiny and need
reconciliation.
A. Fourth Circuit Dents the Shield
The Fourth Circuit in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. 
Fola Coal Co. held that provisions in a NPDES permit that incorporate 
state water quality standards rise to the level of independent, enforceable 
requirements that require compliance if the permit holder wishes to invoke 
the permit shield defense.107 In Fola, an environmental citizen group 
alleged that Fola, a coal operator, violated its NPDES permit by 
discharging excessive amounts of sulfate pollution into the waters of West 
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Virginia.108 Fola’s NPDES permit did not contain any express limitations 
on conductivity or sulfates, although, in its application for renewal of its 
permit, Fola submitted conductivity and sulfate measurements that
revealed aviolation of state water quality standards.109
As expected, Fola asserted the permit shield defense in response to 
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition’s civil lawsuit.110 The district court 
concluded that the permit shield defense did not apply to Fola’s case 
because Fola violated a section of its permit that incorporated by reference 
a West Virginia general water quality standard applicable to coal-related 
NPDES permits.111 Specifically, one of the seven subparts of the 
incorporated state water quality standard stated that discharges covered by 
a West Virginia NPDES permit cannot impact the water source in a way 
that would violate applicable water quality standards enacted by the state 
permitting authority.112
The district court concluded that this incorporated reference in the 
permit prohibited Fola, and other permittees subject to this permit, from 
discharging pollutants that violated state water quality standards to the 
same effect that effluent limitations limit pollutant discharges.113 Thus, the 
district court believed the permit’s incorporation of water quality 
standards provided additional effluent limitations that were enforceable in 
CWA citizen suits.114 Upon a de novo review,115 the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that state water quality 
standards incorporated by reference into Fola's NPDES permit were an
enforceable permit condition.116 This holding resulted from the court’s 
examination of the permit’s language and its cross-reference to state water 
quality.
The cross-referenced language at issue, according to the Fourth 
Circuit, was a straightforward, independent permit condition that prohibits 
permittees from discharging water that violates water quality standards 
regardless of the specific effluent limits that are applied to the permit.117
The court further distinguished Fola’s permit from the permit at issue in 
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Piney Run, which did not require independent compliance with state water 
quality standards.118 The Piney Run permit only provided regulations for 
numerical effluent limitations, and the court addressed how the permit 
shield applied to pollutants not listed in the permit.119 As far as the 
language included in an NPDES permit, the Piney Run court concluded 
that permit holders must comply with all aspects of the permit in order to 
avail themselves of the permit shield defense.120 The Fourth Circuit found 
that NPDES permitting authorities have never been precluded from 
incorporating water quality standards into its permits. As a result, the 
Court found that Fola was in violation of its permit and the permit shield 
defense was inapplicable in the case.
B. The Sixth Circuit Holds Fast
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard 
that the NPDES provision of the CWA seeks not to limit every pollutant, 
but instead intends to restrict the most harmful pollutants, and otherwise 
relies on an applicant's disclosures.121 The Sixth Circuit’s rationale 
indicates that compliance with specific effluent limitations imposed on a 
permit would also qualify as compliance with any permit condition that 
requires water quality standards to be maintained.122
The court reasoned that, if such were not the case, the EPA would have 
to identify not just the pollutants discharged by a single permittee but “all 
of the pollutants and combinations of pollutants that could be discharged”
by all permittees who may later fall under the general permit.123 In ICG
Hazard, a coal mine in Kentucky discharged pollutants, including 
selenium, into waters of the United States.124 The mine had an EPA-
approved and state-issued NPDES general permit that mandated a one-
time sampling for selenium during the five-year lifespan of the general 
permit.125 In anticipation of seeking permit coverage for an expansion of 
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mining operations, ICG Hazard sampled for selenium and confirmed that 
its discharges contained the pollutant.126 Sierra Club asserted that selenium 
was not authorized by the general permit nor could the discharge of 
selenium have been reasonably contemplated by the state when it issued 
the permit.127
The Sixth Circuit concluded that permittees that have applied for and 
received NPDES permit coverage under an NPDES general permit are 
entitled to raise the permit shield as a defense to third-party citizen suits.128
The ICG Hazard court concluded that EPA’s rationale for applying the 
permit shield to unlisted but disclosed pollutants, as described by the 
EAB129 in Ketchikan, was equally applicable to general permits.”130 The
ICG Hazard court stated that the reasoning applies “with even more force 
when dealing with general permits.”131 Sierra Club subscribed to a 
different view with respect to disclosure requirements for a general 
NPDES permit.
Sierra Club argued that “the permitting authority lacked detailed 
information about individual discharges when issuing a general permit 
[and] the scope of a general permit is defined by the effluent limitations 
present in the permit;” therefore, the scope of the permit shield for a 
general permit should be “narrower than the shield of an individual 
permit.”132 The Sixth Circuit noted that the permitting agency did indeed 
contemplate the discharge of selenium, because of the state-monitoring 
requirement that required an initial, albeit one-time, test for selenium at 
some point during the five-year period of permit coverage.133 The court 
found this fact relevant in light of the differences between individual and 
general NPDES permits.
The court distinguished between the requirements of individual 
permits and general permits during the NPDES application process.134 An 
individual permit requires the permit applicant to disclose information 
about potential pollutants and imposes liability if the applicant fails to
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disclose appropriate information.135A general permit, on the other hand,
requires very minimal information from the facility during the permitting 
phase; and it is the duty of the permit writer within the permit issuing 
authority to request any additional information.136 The general permit did 
not require up-front disclosure of selenium, but the permittee did disclose 
the selenium discharge when seeking to modify its permit coverage. 
The ICG Hazard court concluded that the discharge of selenium from 
coal mines covered by the general permit was clearly contemplated by the 
state permitting agency.137 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the permittee 
satisfied both prongs of the Piney Run test and thus was entitled to raise 
the permit shield as a defense to third-party citizen suits.138
IV. A FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT DIVIDES THE JUDICIARY AND OBSCURES 
THE PERMIT SHIELD
The federal circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits raises 
numerous questions about just how far the permit shield defense extends 
with respect to NPDES general permits.139 The Supreme Court should 
clarify the ambiguous status of state water quality standards under the 
Clean Water Act to provide facilities, state permitting authorities, and 
courts with proper guidance on the application of the CWA permit shield 
defense when a state water quality standard exists as an incorporated part 
of a NPDES general permit.
The outcome in Fola raises questions that plagued early provisions of 
the CWA prior to its substantive amendments.140 At one time, the CWA 
focused exclusively on maintaining water quality standards.141 But, 
regulators found it nearly impossible to determine to what degree water 
quality standards fell below acceptable limits and had been violated to 
determine the identity of the alleged violators.142 Subsequent amendments 
to the CWA led to fundamental changes with respect to federal regulation 
of water pollution, namely the creation of the NPDES permitting 
system.143 Indeed, the CWA now seeks to improve the waters of America 
through a two-prong approach intended to focus directly on limiting the 
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discharge of pollutants into the water instead of assessing violations of 
water quality standards ex post effluent discharges.144 The first prong seeks 
to ensure that point source discharges comply with initial effluent 
discharge limitations that reflect the implementation of the best pollutant 
control technology available, regardless of the type of pollutant 
discharged.145 The second prong commands a more particularized—and 
some would argue intrusive—inquiry that focuses on the type of pollutant 
that is discharged.146 The application of the second prong, of course, is not 
without its complexity as it involves decision making at both the federal 
and state level. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fola highlights the underlying 
tension between effluent limitation guidelines and state water quality 
standards. The pollutant discharge limits provided by NPDES permits 
largely draw from the EPA’s technology-based and regulatory effluent 
limitation guidelines, but these guidelines alone do not totally encompass 
the entire discharge limit imposed by state permit issuing authorities.147
State water quality standards, which section 303 of the CWA requires 
every state adopt and submit to the EPA for approval, also impact the 
formation of NPDES discharge limits.148 The regulated parties—always 
the NPDES permit holders—must maintain compliance with the EPA 
effluent limitation guidelines or with discharge limitations issued by the 
state permitting authority, including the applicable state water quality 
standards, whichever regulation is more stringent.149
While state water quality standards are federally required under the 
CWA and approved by the EPA, these standards are established and 
mostly dependent on state-law mechanisms for promulgation and 
enforcement.150 That being the case, state law is not the controlling force 
with respect to state water quality standards. The Supreme Court 
recognized in Arkansas v. Oklahoma that “state water-quality standards—
promulgated by States with substantial guidance from the EPA and 
approved by the Agency—are part of the federal law of water 
pollution.”151 This decision falls squarely on the “federal” side of the 
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federal-state model of cooperative federalism that exists as the core the 
CWA.
If state water quality standards are part of a broader realm of federal 
law under the CWA, then it is not likely that state water quality standards 
would be preempted by federal law under the federal Constitution's 
Supremacy Clause, because both state water quality standards and EPA 
federal water standards comprise two different “federal” regulations, thus 
eliminating any state-federal preemption tension.152 In the event of a 
conflict between the EPA’s water quality standards and a state’s water 
quality standard, the EPA could invoke its power of review and veto under 
the CWA in order to adjust the standards to resolve the conflict.153
Unfortunately, conflict resolutions are not always cut and dry. Disputes 
over a state’s incorporation of state water quality standards and NPDES 
permits often fall on the shoulders of federal courts, which engage in a
highly complex analysis when deciding a conflict between two federal 
laws.154
While states have the primary responsibility of developing water 
quality standards within their respective jurisdictions, these standards 
must be reviewed, updated, and approved every three years to comply with 
current federal standards and EPA regulations.155 If a state’s water quality 
standards are inconsistent with a federal water quality standard, the state 
must determine if a revision of its standards is feasible; if such a revision 
is feasible, the state must revise its standards.156
With this background in mind, it is important to understand a critical 
point not addressed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fola with respect 
to the West Virginia permitting authority and the permit at issue.157 As 
previously discussed,158 the Fola court held that an NPDES permit holder 
could not invoke the permit shield defense because its pollutant discharges 
violated state water quality standards, despite the fact that the permit 
holder disclosed its pollutants during the permit application phase and the 
West Virginia permit issuing authority’s decision not to impose specific 
effluent limitations on the pollutant discharge at issue. Notably absent in 
the Fourth Circuit’s discussion was the federal law that prohibits the 
issuance of an NPDES permit by a permit issuing authority unless the 
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permitting agency finds the discharge will satisfy the relevant state and 
federal water quality standards.159
Fola effectively received an NPDES permit with the presumption that 
its pollutant discharges would satisfy the narrative water quality standard 
incorporated by reference into its permit. It is important to keep in mind 
that it was the West Virginia permit issuing authority that declined to issue 
any kind of numeric limitation on Fola’s sulfate pollutant discharges. It is 
also worth mentioning that, after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the West 
Virginian legislature sought to revise its water quality standards, but this 
effort ended when the EPA flagged these standards for review and delayed 
the revision process.160 This tension is further evident in the mandate that 
a NPDES permit holder must comply with the stricter of the competing 
regulations—whether it be the effluent limitation or the water quality 
standard.161 Under Fola, the question becomes: must an NPDES permit 
holding facility comply with stricter, seemingly unattainable water quality 
standards incorporated into its NPDES permit by reference simply because 
a permit issuing authority failed to include effluent limitation guidelines 
necessary for a discharge to meet the applicable state water quality 
standards? In light of Fola, the answer is unclear.
From the perspective of a facility or permit holder, the aforementioned 
circuit split raises numerous regulatory and financial concerns.162 The 
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Fola should rightfully place facilities on notice 
that the CWA “permit shield” defense may be narrowed or rendered 
unavailable in certain circumstances.163 Particularly in Fola’s case, one 
might be sympathetic to the apparent “lose-lose” situation in which the 
permit holder found itself. One potential solution would be for companies 
to shift away from general permits to individual permits. Indeed, it may be 
safer for a facility to seek coverage under an individual permit, where the 
scope of the shield is heavily dependent on numerical, facility-specific 
effluent limitations and disclosures during the application process.164 As 
previously stated, general permits still widely issue and often save 
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administrative resources and time when a general permit applies to 
multiple facilities of the same kind within a geographic area.165
However, in some cases, a facility’s discharge may not fit the mold of 
a general permit. If the general permit’s language does not cover the types 
of pollutant discharges contemplated by the facility, it is necessary to 
obtain an individual permit to avoid unlawful discharges under the 
CWA.166 While a facility could switch to an individual permit, a 
clarification of the permit shield’s applicability to general permits is still 
necessary.167 The Supreme Court could take one of many approaches to 
solve this federal circuit split.
The Supreme Court could adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Fola
as the new “permit shield” protection standard. Under Fola, a polluting 
facility could comply with the numerical limitations on effluent discharges 
to the numerical limit, disclose all pollutants to the permitting agency, 
reasonably rely on the EPA’s interpretation of the permit shield in 
Ketchikan and the Fourth Circuit’s two-part reasonability test in Piney 
Run, and nevertheless be found liable under ICG Hazard if the facility 
violates state water quality standards incorporated by reference into its 
general permit.168
This type of “all or nothing” standard can lead to inequitable results, 
particularly because an NPDES permit lasts five years, and state water 
quality standards are up for review every three years.169 It does not take 
much imagination to recognize that if a state incorporates environmental 
water quality standards by reference into an individual permit and 
subsequently revises those water quality standards to be more stringent, a 
facility could be forced to comply with stricter standards during the life of 
the same issued permit. This could potentially prevent facilities from 
attaining anchored expectations when applying for NPDES permits and 
creates confusion on how precisely to comply with an issued permit.
Indeed, a stricter standard could cause affected companies to divest and 
relocate to a different state as a result.170
                                                                                                            
165. Joel M. Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, CLEAN WATER ACT 33 (2d ed. 2012).
166. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
167. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
168. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d 133.
169. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21. See Rich, supra note 93.
170. Brief for American Forest & Paper Association, American Petroleum 
Institute, National Association of Clean Water Agencies, National Association of 
Home Builders, National Association of Manufacturers, National Mining 
Association, and Utility Water Act Group as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc., v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, 82 F. Supp. 3d 673 (2015) 
(No. 2:13-5006), 2016 WL 1622091.
608 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
V. CREATING A SAFE HARBOR WITHIN STATE WATER QUALITY 
STANDARDS
In light of this ambiguity in an already complicated statute, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach to state water 
quality standards in the Fola case, subject to a “safe harbor” limitation 
under the CWA “permit shield” provision. The CWA exists for one 
purpose—to protect the waters of America from pollutants.171 The NPDES 
permit is the regulatory exception to the strict liability prohibition of 
discharging pollutants from point sources into waterbodies.172
The Fourth Circuit in Fola correctly noted that there is no limitation 
on a state incorporating its state water quality standards as an independent 
permit provision into an NPDES general permit.173 Congressional intent, 
while unclear and even silent on many provisions of the CWA, is perfectly 
clear when it comes to the application of NPDES—it should be primarily 
a state function to administer a permitting system.174 Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit in Fola correctly noted that to be eligible for the CWA 
permit shield defense, a facility must comply with all elements of an 
NPDES permit; and a cross-reference to state water quality standards 
constitutes a separate, independent section of the permit that a facility must 
follow to be in compliance.175
As previously discussed,176 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) mandates that 
NPDES permits may not issue if the permit issuing authority finds that the 
permit holder’s discharges would violate state and federal water quality 
standards.177 If an NPDES permit issues, as in Fola, and the issuing agency 
does not proscribe any type of numerical effluent limitation on a pollutant 
discharge that results in a state water quality violation, the NPDES permit 
holder receives protection under the permit shield provision.178
Facilities already have a limited “safe harbor” with respect to their 
numerical effluent discharge limits under the interpretation of the permit 
shield provision; however, facilities may be exposed to liability if an 
NPDES permit incorporates state water quality standards that 
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subsequently change during the life of the existing NPDES permit.179 A
state permitting authority cannot change effluent limitations during the 
course of an active NPDES permit and reasonably expect to bring an 
enforcement action. A “safe harbor” should also apply to a state’s water 
quality standards incorporated into an NPDES general permit. If a state 
incorporates these water quality standards in an NPDES permit, a facility 
should be required to follow the standards in place at the time the permit 
was issued, and should not be penalized in a subsequent enforcement 
action where the state water quality standards changed prior to permit 
expiration. 
Additionally, states should strive to include more than just boilerplate 
language, which can lead to ambiguity and uncertainty as standards 
evolve. States would be better served to explicitly designate in permits the 
minimum requirements envisioned for adequately meeting state water 
quality standards. For example, in the Fola decision, the language included 
in the West Virginia permit referencing state water quality standards 
contained vague and amorphous language.180 The broader the language, 
the more potential for ambiguity, and the more likely confusion and 
uncertainty will occur downstream.
From an environmental perspective, the waters of the United States 
are often their own unique ecosystems. The waters of Bayou Lafourche in 
Louisiana are unlike the waters of Lake Michigan; the waters of 
Chesapeake Bay have different needs than the waters of Puget Sound.
Different state water quality standards have different needs based on a 
multitude of geographic, demographic, and environmental factors. While 
the scope of the permit shield provision is narrower now than at its 
inception, the spirit of the CWA is still very much alive through a narrow 
construction of the permit shield. States should actively incorporate their 
state water quality standards into their general NPDES permits, subject to 
the permit issuing authority providing regulatory guidance to the regulated 
parties.
This narrowing of the CWA’s permit shield provision dents the scope 
of the permit shield, but it is far from a fatal blow. The ability for a facility 
to obtain immunity from liability from suit under the CWA outweighs, in 
many cases, the cost of compliance.181
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CONCLUSION
The federal courts, permit issuing authorities, and industry stakeholders 
need a clear interpretation of the ambiguous CWA “permit shield” 
provision’s application to state water quality standards that are incorporated 
into an NPDES permit. State permitting authorities in cooperation with the 
EPA should be allowed to incorporate state water quality standards as 
independent permit provisions that provide clearly defined state water 
quality limits, which serve to provide an “outer limit” on the allowable level 
of pollutants in a water source. Further, the permit shield should apply even
when an NDPES permit issuing authority decides not to set effluent 
numerical limitations on pollutant discharges, and instead only relies on a 
facility’s disclosure of pollutants during the permit application process. This 
can be accomplished by avoiding boilerplate language in permits and 
providing permit holding facilities the ability to anchor their compliance 
expectations prior to and during the permit application process, rather than 
respond to lawsuits or enforcement actions brought as a result of ambiguity 
and misunderstandings of statutory requirements. Providing these additional 
steps for polluting facilities to follow, subject to a safe harbor provision, can 
uphold standards within the CWA and provide industry facilities with 
guidance to the steps necessary for compliance.
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